The new counterinsurgency doctrine and Americas new way of war

Iraq thoughts end of 2007.

The Surge has vindicated finally the argument that the troop-to-task ratio was screwed up under Donal Rumsfeld. Eric Shinseki was right. For half of 2003 and for all of 2004, 2005 and 2006 when the civilians at the Defense Department kept telling us that the troops in the field had all the troops they needed and we kept hearing that they did not. The strategy the military was following represents a repudiation of three and a half years of "Beyond Nation building" Utopian garbage.

This is the most interesting discussion of the American way of war that I've heard since 9/11. It represents the most fully realized requirements to head in a new direction that the U.S. has been contemplating for the past 6 years. And these ideas are presented here to you by Charlie Rose and two very interesting ladies. I hope you enjoy it as much as I did.